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Abstract 
 
This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, 
provides an overview of current approaches to countering terrorist narratives. The 
first and second sections outline the different responses developed at the global 
and European Union levels. The third section presents an analysis of four different 
approaches to responding to terrorist narratives: disruption of propaganda 
distribution, redirect method, campaign and message design, and government 
communications and synchronisation of message and action. The final section 
offers a number of policy recommendations, highlighting five interrelated ‘lines of 
effort’ essential to maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of counter-
terrorism and countering violent extremism strategic communication.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. Global initiatives to counter terrorist narratives are carried out by a number of different 
actors on the supranational, international, regional, national and sub-national levels. The 
UN has established itself as a key player in the field of counter-narratives, inspiring 
related institutions, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and Hedayah, to 
assist states in building concrete plans of action in this field. Other international 
organisations, such as NATO and OSCE, have implemented initiatives that focus on 
strategic communications and counter-narratives. States have also increased efforts in 
countering terrorist narratives through cooperation with other states or non-state 
institutional partners. Finally, tech companies have taken steps to prevent abuse of their 
platforms by terrorist actors. 
 
2. The EU has assumed a leading role in counter-narrative efforts through its own agencies 
and programmes as well as through supporting external initiatives. Europol plays a key 
role in removing illegal terrorist content from the Internet while the EU Internet Forum 
provides a platform to disrupt terrorist content and amplify counter-narratives. The EU 
also facilitates a network of front line practitioners, the Radicalisation Awareness 
Network, which provides analyses of existing counter-narrative efforts. Finally, there are 
a number of institutes working at the European level, often in partnership with either 
the EU or Member States, which facilitate the creation of counter-narratives between 
governments, industry, and civil society. 
 
3. There are four key trends in current efforts to tackle terrorist propaganda: 
 
i. Disruption of propaganda distribution – The key objective is to interfere with the 
distribution of propaganda, in short, to try and stop propaganda at the source by 
preventing it from reaching its target audience. In particular, this has focussed on 
taking down propaganda from social media and deleting offending accounts. 
 
ii.  Redirect method – Rather than erasing propaganda, this approach seeks to 
redirect viewers to different messages in an attempt to ‘nudge’ their behaviour. 
Pioneered by Jigsaw and Moonshot CVE, this project redirects those searching for 
jihadist material to counter-messaging.  
 
iii.  Campaign and message design – These projects seek to provide information and 
skills to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to develop communication campaigns, 
typically based on counter-narrative or alternative-narrative approaches. Whilst 
disruption seeks to stop the spread of propaganda, this approach seeks to enable 
CSOs with the skills to confront and undermine the propaganda. 
 
iv.   Government communications and synchronisation of message and action - There 
is a tendency for communication campaigns to be designed in a vacuum, 
disconnected from events in real life. Synchronisation approaches take a 
comprehensive perspective and aim to link messages and actions, and to 
coordinate messaging across government and with international partners. The 
strength of these approaches is to prevent the undermining of a narrative by 
exposing its ‘say-do-gap’, through ensuring message and actions are aligned, and 
through limiting contradictory messaging. 
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4. Although the idea of counter-narratives is widely supported by governments, think tanks 
and NGOs, the concept itself is rather underdeveloped and lacks a thorough grounding 
in empirical research. There is little evidence to support the effectiveness of counter-
narratives and many of its underlying assumptions have been called into question. There 
is a need for greater research in this area and, in particular, effective monitoring and 
evaluation of current counter-narrative projects in order to be able to ensure that lessons 
are learned. 
 
5. Counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) strategic 
communications efforts across various programmes and initiatives can be informed by 
the following recommendations: 
 
i. Disruption of violent extremist material needs to be applied comprehensively and 
across multiple platforms, in order to avoid displacing terrorist messaging activity 
between channels. The vacuum created by disruption needs to be filled with a series 
of messages designed to leverage a range of motivational drivers, in order to 
resonate with a target audience subject to varying motivations and in order to have 
a reinforcing cumulative effect on that audience.  
ii. To ensure coherent messaging over the short, medium and long term, campaign 
and message design principles need to be synchronised through the establishment 
of a clear and simple-to-understand, overarching central narrative, which is 
supported by a thematically diverse array of messages.  
 
iii. A clear identification of the target audience is vital to effective strategic 
communications, taking into account a spectrum of potential consumers of the 
message (intended, unintended, supporters, adversaries and neutrals). A nuanced 
behavioural and attitudinal understanding of that audience is needed to 
persuasively shape attitudes and behaviours. 
iv. Measuring the efficacy of strategic communications requires assessments that 
focus on measures of strategic literacy, technical literacy and target audience. 
These assessments need to be initially performed prior to the commencement of a 
strategic communications effort in order to establish a baseline measure. Once the 
baseline metrics are established, these assessments need to be regularly 
implemented as a means to gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of the campaign 
over time. 
 
v. In order to gain trust, credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of a target audience, 
messaging needs to be synchronised with activities on the ground, thereby 
reducing the perceived disparity between what one says and does (the ‘say-do 
gap’). The central requirement for improving the synchronisation of messaging and 
action across bureaucracies is largely cultural. Archaic attitudes that ‘actions speak 
louder than words’ contribute to an organisational culture, often reinforced by 
doctrine, which affords strategic communications an ex post facto role in 
operations, strategy and policy. Strategic communications should be a key 
consideration in planning from the beginning of the operational, strategic and policy 
design process.  
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Introduction to Strategic Communications and Counter-Terrorism 
 
Fundamentally, terrorism is communication; acts of terror themselves are propaganda by 
deed and, as such, strategic communications will always be a central part of counter-
terrorism. The rise of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) and their successful and prolific use 
of online propaganda has raised the issue of terrorist propaganda in the public consciousness, 
in particular in terms of recruitment and radicalisation. In response, governmental actors are 
keen to understand and counter such communications; they believe that winning the 
communication war is a vital part of defeating terrorists. Although this has received renewed 
attention given the contemporary global threat of terrorism, it does not represent a new 
phenomenon. Rather, “persuasive communications have been partnered with war for 
millennia,”1 perhaps as far back as the Mesolithic and Epipaleolithic periods in which cave 
paintings depicted men fighting.2 Indeed, “during times of war and peace, state and non-
state actors have sought to weld the ever evolving platforms of mass media and 
communications into instruments of control.”3 In short, it would be wrong to consider the 
threat posed by non-state actors to the state, or the state’s response, anything but a 
continuation of the ongoing struggle for communication control and the authority of the state. 
Today, a large part of this task is achieved via message disruption – that is to say either 
content removal on the Internet, or proscription of illegal speech – however, “there are 
severe limitations on the effectiveness of this response, given the speed with which new data 
is uploaded and the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies.”4 As a result, there has 
been a renewed interest in countering the narratives of terrorist organisations, rather than 
purely restricting them. 
 
There are three important levels at which such communications take place – macro, mezzo, 
and micro – referring to the scope of the message being delivered, each with a specific set 
of considerations. Macro-level considerations include the reach, relevance, and resonance of 
the message, while at the mezzo level, one must consider the specific medium, messenger, 
and the format of the message. Finally, at the micro level, considerations must be made 
relating to the design of the specific message itself, including rational-choice (based on a 
cost-benefit analysis of options) and identity-choice (based on considerations of one’s 
identity) messaging, defensive and offensive messaging, and the say-do gap.5  The latter, 
simply the differences between what we say and what we do, can serve to undermine the 
credibility, and in the process, the effectiveness of counter-messaging. A successful 
                                                 
 
1 Haroro J. Ingram and Alastair Reed, “Lessons from History for Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications,” 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 4 (2016): 3, https://www.icct.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Ingram-CTSC-June-2016-3.pdf. 
2 Haroro J. Ingram, “A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter-terrorism Strategic 
Communications,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 4, (2016): 6, 
https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Haroro-Ingram-Brief-History-Propaganda-June-2016-
LATEST.pdf. 
3 Kate Ferguson, “Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies: A Review of the 
Evidence,” Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research, March 1, 2016, 7, 
http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-
and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf. 
4 Rachel Briggs and Sebastian Feve, “Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What Works 
and What are the Implications for Government?” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, (2013): 1, 
https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/444/review-of-programs-to-counter-narratives-of-violent-
extremism-what-works-and-what-are-the-implications-for-government. 
5 Haroro J. Ingram and Alastair Reed, “Lessons from History for Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications.” 
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messaging campaign will consider all three levels while producing a diversity of messages, 
including an overarching narrative, and be disseminated via a number of different mediums.6 
 
Despite the fact that terrorist narratives and strategic responses are important to a wide 
range of groups and ideologies, this report largely focuses on the threat posed by IS and 
other violent Islamist groups, and the responses to this threat. That is merely indicative of 
the current political climate and global security issues since the rise to prominence of the 
group and is not a suggestion that other groups and ideologies do not pose a threat. Rather, 
the authors encourage a stronger focus on and more research into counter- and alternative 
narratives against all types of violent extremist groups. 
 
Counter-narratives, Alternative Narratives, and Government 
Strategic Communications 
 
One problem with the notion of counter-narratives is that it has a wide breadth of meanings, 
which leads to a considerable amount of ambiguity. It can refer to government-led initiatives, 
deradicalisation strategies, or grassroots and civil society movements and can be speaking 
to a number of different audiences – such as extremists, those vulnerable to extremism, 
members of communities that include extremists, or the general population at large. It can 
also include a number of different messages, such as those trying to discredit or make fun of 
extremists, or those trying to empower communities by promoting different stories. As a 
result of this lack of clarity, Briggs and Feve created the “counter-messaging spectrum” to 
deconstruct the different kinds of messages (See figure 1).7 They suggest that there are 
three types of counter-messages: government strategic communications, alternative 
narratives, and counter-narratives. Government strategic communications exist to present 
government policy and strategy in a positive light; this may take the form of a public 
awareness campaign. Alternative narratives, which are undertaken by either government or 
civil society, aim to present a new narrative, rather than engaging on the same terms as the 
extremist content. This may include stories relating to diversity, or tolerance, or social values. 
Finally, counter-narratives, which are best used by civil society, directly tackle an extremist 
narrative in an attempt to discredit violent extremists’ messages.8 As well as the type of 
counter-narrative, it can also be important to determine the ‘location’ of the audience. For 
example, ‘upstream’ audiences may be targeted by broad ‘counter-radicalisation’ messages, 
while ‘downstream’ audiences may include already radicalised individuals.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
6 Ibid.  
7 Rachel Briggs and Sebastian Feve, “Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism.”  
8 Ibid. 
9 Radicalisation Awareness Network, “Counter Narratives and Alternative Narratives,” RAN Issue Paper (2015): 4-5, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_cn_oct2015_en.pdf. 
Countering Terrorist Narratives 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 11 
 
What  Why How Who 
Government 
Strategic 
Communications 
Action to get the message 
out about what 
government is doing, 
including public awareness 
activities 
Raise awareness, forge 
relationships with key 
constituencies and 
audiences and correct 
misinformation 
Government 
Alternative 
Narratives 
Undercut violent extremist 
narratives by focusing on 
what we are ‘for’ rather 
than ‘against’ 
Positive story about 
social values, 
tolerance, openness, 
freedom and 
democracy 
Civil society or 
government 
Counter-
Narratives 
Directly deconstruct, 
discredit and demystify 
violent extremist 
messaging 
Challenge through 
ideology, logic, fact or 
humour 
Civil society 
Source: Rachel Briggs and Sebastian Feve, “Review of programs to counter narratives of violent extremism: What 
works and what are the implications for government?” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, (2013). 
Criticisms of counter-narratives 
 
The idea of countering terrorists’ narratives sounds promising in theory, but there are a 
number of criticisms that point to potential problems. The first is that, put simply, because 
the study of counter-narratives is a new field, there is a sizeable gap between the volume 
and quality of counter-narratives and the sophisticated propaganda that terrorist 
organisations, such as IS, have used since 2014.10   
 
Second, the relationship between viewing extremist content and actually engaging in violent 
extremism is not clear. Although the vast majority of terrorist actors share and engage with 
extremist narratives, suggesting a correlation, there is still little evidence to support notion 
that exposure to extremist content has a causal effect on future violent extremism activity.11 
However, as Dr Kate Ferguson, sums up “the picture is somewhat mixed: while there is some 
evidence suggesting patterns of discourse and communication such as hate speech, 
dehumanisation, and identity-based narratives (or propaganda) can contribute to conditions 
where IBV [Identity Based Violence] or VE [Violent Extremism] becomes more likely, the 
causal relationship remains unproven.”12 In contemporary Terrorism Studies, empirical 
research suggests that not all those who develop extreme beliefs become terrorists, and that 
many terrorist actors do not ‘radicalise’ in any traditional sense.13 This undermines the notion 
that extremist narratives have a direct causal effect on extremist actions.  
 
It is important, however, not to oversell this notion. Clearly, there is a great deal of evidence 
to suggest messaging has an effect on consumers – this has been the premise of television 
advertising since its inception – it would be wrong to suggest we are completely in the dark. 
Furthermore, the fact that the most prosperous extremist groups in recent history, such as 
IS, have invested heavily in propaganda efforts should not be ignored – obviously, they 
                                                 
 
10 Ibid., 2. 
11 Kate Ferguson, “Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies,” 9. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Randy Borum, “Rethinking Radicalization,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011). 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/1/. 
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believe that it has some impact on their recruitment prospects. However, the dearth of 
empirical evidence assessing the relationship between extremist propaganda and violent 
actions should also make us less confident in any conclusions in both this relationship and 
the efficacy of narratives that counter such propaganda. In short, in a comparatively new 
field, far more research is needed to better understand these relationships. 
 
Finally, counter-narratives are inherently defensive in nature. That is to say, they “merely 
respond to the opposition’s message, allowing them to set the ground on which the 
communication battle will be fought and to maintain control of the narrative.”14 Although it 
is neither possible nor desirable to remove defensive messaging from a communication 
strategy, successful campaigns will be comprehensive, integrated and multi-dimensional, 
including both offensive and defensive messages. To merely respond to terrorist groups who 
have relatively sophisticated propaganda strategies is both naïve and doomed to failure. 
                                                 
 
14 Alastair Reed, “IS Propaganda: Should We Counter the Narrative?” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – 
The Hague, March, 17 2017, https://icct.nl/publication/is-propaganda-should-we-counter-the-narrative/.  
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN AND PROJECTS SET 
UP ON A GLOBAL LEVEL 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Global initiatives to counter terrorist narratives are diverse in a number of ways. Not 
only are there a number of different actors, but different kinds of actors 
(supranational, international, regional, national, sub-national). 
 The UN is a key player and, through different resolutions, strategies and action plans, 
prescribes that states and regional organisations should develop their own plans of 
action to counter violent extremism and counter terrorist propaganda. 
 Organisations such as the GCTF and Hedayah stem from and are guided by these UN 
actions and aim to assist states in building such plans of action. 
 The Coalition to Defeat Daesh utilises the Global Coalition Communications Cell, 
housed in the UK Foreign Office, to undermine the group’s propaganda in a number 
of ways. 
 The US continues to be a major player in countering terrorist narratives, although the 
manner in which it delivers such narratives has changed, moving from a direct to an 
indirect approach, and focusing on facilitating other actors with more credible voices 
to deliver messages. 
 Examples of such actors are the Sawab Center and RDC3, based in the UAE and 
Malaysia, respectively. 
 A number of tech companies also play an important role through organisations such 
as GIFTC and Tech Against Terrorism, which aim to empower and build the capacity 
of all tech companies against their platforms being abused by terrorist actors.  
 NATO has two Centres of Excellence in Riga and Ankara, which focus on strategic 
communications against terrorist actors.  
 The OSCE, guided by the UN Global Terrorism Strategy and its own counter-terrorism 
strategy, aims to empower stakeholders in countering violent extremism. This is done 
by facilitating dialogue between a number of different actors as well as through 
campaigns, such as the #UnitedCVE campaign.  
1.1. Introduction 
 
There are a number of global and regional initiatives that exist in the fight against terrorist 
narratives. These include the numerous resolutions, strategies, and action plans of the United 
Nations (UN), which prescribe how Member States should counter extremist messages. There 
are also a number of organisations, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and 
Hedayah, which stem from and are guided by such UN actions. The Coalition to Defeat Daesh 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
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uses numerous methods to degrade the group’s propaganda.15  States, such as the US, also 
take a central role. In previous years, it had attempted to counter terrorist narratives directly, 
through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), whereas it now 
often takes the role of facilitator through the Global Engagement Center (GEC), encouraging 
other counter-narrative organisations, such as the Sawab Center and Regional Digital 
Counter-Messaging Communication Center (RDC3), to become the messenger. Many private 
actors, such as Silicon Valley tech companies, also play an important role through bodies 
such as the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFTC) and Tech Against Terrorism, 
while the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Centres of Excellence in Riga and 
Ankara play an important part in the organisation’s counter-narratives against terrorist 
actors. Finally, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), through 
the UN and its own counter-terrorism strategies, has a number of methods by which it 
counters terrorist narratives, such as the #UnitedCVE campaign. These initiatives are by no 
means exhaustive, but offer an outline of the type of responses in place. 
1.2. UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) 
 
The UN and its Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED) have been at the forefront 
of countering violent extremism since the events of 11th September 2001, which can be seen 
in a number of documents and resolutions. One example is the UN Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, adopted by the General Assembly in 2006; the first of its four pillars addressing the 
conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.16 There are a number of resolutions and plans 
that relate to this pillar. This includes Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), which is 
concerned with stemming the flow of foreign fighters, and which highlights Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) as an essential element in addressing the problem.17 Similarly, in 2016, the 
UN published the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE), which implored Member 
States to develop their own PVE plans of action, encompassing a number of stakeholders in 
society.18 It also recognised that state-led initiatives are not in themselves sufficient and that 
“Member States should come together to complement [their national] strategies or adopt new 
regional or sub regional plans of action to prevent violent extremism.”19 The plan offers a 
number of suggestions to do this, including via strategic communications, for which Member 
States should “develop and implement national communications strategies, in close 
cooperation with social media companies and the private sector, that are tailored to local 
contexts…to challenge the narratives associated with violent extremism.”20  
 
In April 2017, the Security Council published a comprehensive international framework to 
counter terrorist narratives. There were three key foci to this framework: first, relating to legal 
and law enforcement measures in accordance with states’ obligations under international law 
and UN resolutions; second, encouraging public-private partnerships, especially between 
Internet gatekeepers, and third, the development of counter-narratives, highlighting the 
                                                 
 
15 European Commission, “Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism,” June 14, 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-
preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf. 
16 United Nations, “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Plan of Action,” United Nations Counter-terrorism 
Implementation Task Force, 2006, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-
strategy#plan.  
17 United Nations, S/Res/2178, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf. 
18 United Nations, “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism,” 2015, 12, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
20 Ibid., 19. 
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importance of public-private partnerships and governments acting as ‘facilitators’ rather than 
direct messengers of counter-narratives.21  
An example of the CTED’s work in facilitating this is the partnership between the directorate 
and UN Women, which held two regional workshops in Bangkok, Thailand during the week of 
25th – 29th September 2017 to engage local communities in CVE. During this week, attention 
was given to effective approaches to countering terrorist incitement and recruitment online, 
in a special day-long session organised by Facebook, Google and the local non-governmental 
organisation Love Frankie.22   
1.3. Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)/Hedayah Center 
 
The GCTF was created in 2011 by 29 founding Member States, including the US, the UK, the 
UAE, the Netherlands, and China, as well as the EU in an informal environment to act on 
counter-terrorism efforts. The forum “serves as a mechanism for furthering the 
implementation of the universally-agreed UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.”23 This 
includes the above-mentioned UN ‘first pillar’, addressing the conditions conducive to 
terrorism. Beyond its 30 members, it also “works extensively with non-GCTF members 
including states, international, regional and sub-regional bodies; and other stakeholders and 
experts.”24 This includes a number of UN bodies, the African Union, ASEAN, and INTERPOL. 
One of the core initiatives of the GCTF is the CVE Working Group, which includes the Initiative 
on Strategic Communications and Social Media Aspects in Preventing/Countering Violent 
Extremism (P/CVE), which “aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of potential 
approaches and methodologies for governments to counter violent extremism online.”25 
 
During the launch of the GCTF in New York in September 2011, there was a widespread 
desire for the members of the forum to create an international and independent centre of 
excellence dedicated to countering violent extremism. The UAE offered to host what became 
known as the Hedayah Center, which was created formally in December 2012 with a focus 
on “capacity building programs, dialogue and communications, in addition to research and 
analysis to counter violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations.”26  Hedayah’s focus 
on dialogue and communications is aimed at closely engaging “with communities and 
stakeholders that have only been peripherally involved in CVE in the past… [including] 
previously under-represented groups (e.g. youth, women, educators and community 
leaders).”27 Furthermore, it encourages the design of counter-narrative messages through 
their “Counter-Narrative Library”, “a comprehensive portal where governments, front-line 
workers and civil society can access content, toolkits and good practices to counter the 
narratives of all forms of violent extremism.”28 With regard to capacity-building, Hedayah 
partners with the GCTF and the Global Center on Cooperative Security to implement a task 
                                                 
 
21 United Nations, S/2017/375, April 28, 2017. https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/blog/document/s2017375-
comprehensive-international-framework-to-counter-terrorist-narratives/. 
22 United Nations, “UN, CTED and UN Women partner in countering violent extremism in South and South-East Asia,” 
United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee, September 30, 2017, 
https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/blog/2017/09/30/cted-and-un-women-partner-in-countering-violent-extremism-in-
south-and-south-east-asia/.  
23 “Members and Partners,” GCTF, https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/Members-and-partners.  
24 Ibid.  
25 GCTF, “Countering Violent Extremism Working Group,” Working Groups, https://www.thegctf.org/Working-
Groups/Countering-Violent-Extremism.  
26 “About us: History,” Hedayah Center, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/about-us/177/history./. 
27 “Dialogue and Communications,” Hedayah Center, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/what-we-
do/91/departments/93/dialogue-and-communications.   
28 “Counter-Narrative Library,” Hedayah Center, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/what-we-
do/91/departments/98/research-and-analysis/477/counter-narrative-library.  
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 16 
force for the above-mentioned UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to work with 
countries that need assistance in building their own national action plans.29 
1.4. Coalition to Defeat Daesh 
 
A major role of the global Coalition to Defeat Daesh, which includes 69 states and four 
institutions (the Arab League, EU, INTERPOL, and NATO), is in strategic communications. 
There are five mutually reinforcing aspects in the effort to degrade and defeat IS, including 
two for which counter-narratives are key: impeding the flow of foreign fighters to the region 
and exposing the group’s true nature.30 The Global Coalition Communications Cell, housed in 
the UK, was set up in September 2015, for which the UK Foreign Office provided £10 million, 
bringing all of the coalition partners together behind a single communications initiative.31 The 
British government claims that “through the UK’s leadership, the Cell has changed the 
international narrative around Daesh – from one that highlights their atrocities to one which 
emphasises their failures,”32 with the ultimate goal of damaging the perception of Daesh and 
reducing their ability to recruit. The government notes that it provides information packs to 
Coalition partners which contain facts and figures regarding the degradation of the group. 
Additionally, an account is maintained on Twitter posting  regular updates regarding the 
conflict against IS, including question and answer sessions from soldiers on the ground in 
Iraq and Syria,33 military updates portraying the coalition’s successes,34 and statements 
portraying the group in a negative light, such as: “Under Daesh, the fine arts school for boys 
in East Mosul became a factory for suicide belts.”35 The Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh 
website houses a variety of different counter-narrative content that exposes “falsehoods that 
lie at the heart of Daesh ideology and…present[s] a positive alternative future for the 
region,”36 as well as instructional advice to readers on how to report the group’s online 
propaganda.37 
1.5. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications 
(CSCC)/Global Engagement Center (GEC) 
 
Established in 2010, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) was 
a US interagency-based unit housed in the State Department. Its remit was to systematise 
a unified US narrative in an attempt to counter the growing volume and influence of violent 
extremist ideologies, especially on the Internet. The CSCC had a number of core priorities, 
including: monitoring and evaluating extremist narratives online, developing and 
disseminating US strategic communications, identifying trends in extremist narratives, and 
                                                 
 
29 “Launching the PCVE National Action Plans Task Force,” Hedayah Center, 2016, 
http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-31102016141924.pdf.  
30 “The Global Coalition to Defeat IS,” US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/s/seci/.  
31 UK Parliament, Appendix: Letter from the Foreign Secretary and Government Response, June 8, 2016, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/209/20904.htm.  
32“UK Action to Combat Daesh,” UK Government, https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/daesh/about.  
33 UK Against Daesh (@UKagainstdaesh), Twitter, https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/media.  
34 UK Against Daesh (@UKagainstdaesh), “UPDATE: approx 80% of Raqqa is now cleared of #Daesh @CTJFOIR,” 
Twitter, (October 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/status/916965141350141953.  
35 UK Against Daesh (@UKagainstdaesh), “Under #Daesh arts schools were banned, whilst bomb-making factories 
flourished,” Twitter, (October 7, 2017), https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/status/916604766435803136.  
36 “Countering Daesh’s Propaganda,” Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh, February 3, 2017, 
http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/countering-daeshs-propaganda/.  
37 “How to report Daesh’s Terrorist Propaganda,” Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh, March 21, 2017, 
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collecting relevant data from other US agencies.38 The Center had three streams of work: 
gathering and analysis of information, planning and operations (which specialised in non-
digital communication), and the Digital Outreach Team. The CSCC and the Digital Outreach 
Team in particular, was criticised in the years following its establishment for launching 
strategies that directly interacted with IS militants online in its “Think Again Turn Away” 
campaign, launched in English in December 2013. Critics claimed that this offered a platform 
for many who may not otherwise have seen such content and that the campaigns lacked 
even the most basic understanding of the complex conflict.39 
 
The CSCC was replaced by the GEC in March 2016 by Executive Order 13721 of President 
Obama.40 Rather than the direct strategy of the CSCC, the GEC takes a more indirect and 
partnership-oriented approach, attempting to work with local actors, who can provide a more 
credible voice. The GEC will be discussed in more detail as a specific case study in Section 3.  
1.6. Sawab Center/Malaysian Regional Digital Counter-Messaging 
Center (RDC3) 
 
Two examples of local actors that the GEC is partnered with are the Sawab Center and the 
RDC3. The former is in partnership with the UAE and focuses on exposing IS’s incompetence 
rather than portraying the group’s brutality, while the latter with the Royal Malaysian Police 
is aimed at curbing IS ideology online. Both will be discussed further in Section 3. 
1.7. Tech Companies  
 
A number of private actors, especially those in Silicon Valley, have engaged in strategic 
communications to counter terrorism on their platforms. Internet gatekeepers have been 
frequently accused by policymakers of facilitating terrorist narratives on their sites,41 and 
have developed a number of responses. One example is the GIFTC, launched in July 2017 by 
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube, in an attempt to make their services hostile to 
terrorists and violent extremists. The Forum has three key streams of work: providing 
technical solutions, commissioning research on counter-speech efforts and knowledge 
sharing – both with each other an d aiding smaller companies in developing successful 
counter-terrorism measures.42 Each of the companies have their own individual counter-
speech initiatives, such as YouTube’s Creators for Change,43 Jigsaw’s Redirect Method,44  
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Newsroom, July 31, 2017, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/07/global-internet-forum-to-counter-terrorism-to-
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43 “Creators for Change,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/yt/creators-for-change/.  
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Facebook’s P2P Challenging Extremism,45 and Microsoft’s partnership with the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue.46 The Jigsaw and Microsoft initiatives will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 3. The new Forum will allow these initiatives “to learn from and contribute to one 
another’s counter speech efforts, and discuss how to further empower and train civil society 
organisations.”47  
 
The GIFTC is part of a wider initiative in partnership with the UN CTED and Swiss foundation 
ICT4Peace called Tech Against Terrorism, whose members include the above four actors, and 
others, such as Telefonica, Soundcloud, Askfm, Snapchat, and Justpaste.it.48 The aim of the 
project is to provide operational support to willing actors to prevent their communication 
technology from being exploited. This includes a four-step process of carrying out a risk 
assessment, offering tools to protect the platform, receiving a certified “trust mark”, before 
being invited to access a knowledge sharing platform for extremist content.49 Tech Against 
Terrorism also organises workshops around the world for “constructive action-focused 
discussions on specific issues.”50  In 2017, there have been, or are scheduled to be, events 
in Paris, London, Jakarta, and New York. 
1.8. NATO Centres of Excellence  
 
NATO regards countering terrorism as one of the fundamental security tasks facing the union 
today. In fact, the one and only time in which NATO has triggered Article Five of the 
Washington Treaty – referring to collective self-defence – was after the events of 11th 
September 2001.51 NATO hosts a number of “Centres of Excellence” in different Member 
States, including two that relate specifically to countering terrorist narratives. First, the 
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia, which was established in 
2014, is a dedicated operation that focuses on the dissemination of content via a number of 
channels, including “traditional media, internet-based media and public engagement, to build 
awareness, understanding, and support for its decisions and operations.”52 Although the 
Centre originally focused on hybrid warfare from Russia, it has begun to take a focus on 
terrorism and CVE recently. Included in the Program of Work for the Centre in 2017 is to 
research the topic of “Violent Extremism as an emerging threat for NATO nations” as well as 
a number of projects researching the use and abuse of social media.53 The Centre also hosts 
a number of different pieces of research for better understanding terrorists’ narratives, 
including research on IS’s doctrine of information warfare and analysis of Foreign Fighters on 
YouTube.54   
The second relevant NATO Centre of Excellence is Defence Against Terrorism, based in 
Ankara, Turkey. Its mission is to provide decision-makers with realistic solutions to terrorism 
and counter-terrorism challenges. Courses and conferences provided by the Ankara Centre 
                                                 
 
45 “Peer to Peer: Challenging Extremism,” EdVenture Partners, https://edventurepartners.com/peer-to-peer-
challenging-extremism/.  
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include topics such as: terrorist use of cyberspace, radicalisation and countering violent 
extremism, and terrorism and the media.55 The Centre also publishes the biannual “Defence 
Against Terrorism Review”, an academic journal focusing on a number of different counter-
terrorism topics. Recent topics include: countering radicalisation and recruitment in the 
context of radicalisation “hubs,”56  IS propaganda on the Internet,57  and countering 
ideological terrorism.58 
1.9. OSCE/OSCE United 
 
The world’s largest regional security association, the OSCE, also has a number of ways in 
which it fights terrorism. It consists of 57 different states across Europe, Asia, and North 
America.59 The OSCE’s principles in countering terrorism are guided by and support the 2006 
UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy – which includes addressing the conditions conducive 
to terrorism as one of its four pillars – as well as its own OSCE Consolidated Framework for 
the Fight Against Terrorism, which includes the promotion of CVE and stemming recruitment 
to terrorist organisations.60 To achieve this, the organisation works with a number of 
governments, practitioners, researchers, and civil society representatives, which focus on 
community-based preventative measures “such as youth and women’s engagement and what 
rule community policing can play.”61 This stream of work also organised events, such as the 
OSCE-wide conference on this topic in Vienna in May 2017, which brought together 
approximately 550 participants from participating states.62 Further strategic foci of the 
OSCE’s counter-terrorism activities include countering the use of the Internet for terrorist 
purposes and facilitating a public-private partnership between states and the private sector 
(including tech industries), as well as civil society and the media.63  An example of both of 
these in action can be seen in the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2016, in which 
a series of short courses were arranged on the use of the Internet and social media and how 
to develop successful counter-narratives in innovative ways.64 
 
One of the key campaigns undertaken by the OSCE, called #UnitedCVE, was developed in 
July 2015, initiated by the OSCE Secretary General and the OSCE Serbian Chairmanship. In 
line with the OSCE’s focus on P/CVE and radicalisation that leads to terrorism, the multi-
platform campaign, which has both online and offline elements, aims to raise awareness of 
issues related to extremism while offering an engagement platform for members of civil 
society. This is done by “promoting tolerance, mutual respect, pluralism, inclusion, and 
cohesion.”65 In the first 18 months of the campaign, #UnitedCVE reached more than 16 
million people online, engaging both those in OSCE-participating states and beyond. An 
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example of this was the hosting of the final of the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Challenging Extremism 
competition, sponsored by the US State Department and Facebook, in which university 
students from around the world “identify, develop and pitch a digital or social initiative, 
product or tool to educate and empower their peers to challenge violent extremism.”66 
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2. ACTIONS TAKEN AND PROJECTS SET UP ON A EUROPEAN 
LEVEL 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The EU Internet Forum facilitates dialogue between the Commission and tech 
companies to develop a safer web, both by disrupting terrorist content and by 
amplifying counter-narratives. The former is done in partnership with Europol while 
the latter in cooperation with the CSEP, which builds capacity on countering narratives 
for those vulnerable to extremism. 
 While not always a topic explicitly linked to terrorism, the Code of Conduct on 
Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online is posited as an important document in 
stemming online dialogue that could lead to terrorism. It includes commitments to 
review most flagged content within 24 hours, educate and raise awareness, and 
promote counter-narratives. 
 Europol removes illegal terrorist content from the Internet, analyses such content and 
provides a platform for dialogue among practitioners and academics.  
 The RAN is an important part of the EU’s fight against terrorist narratives, connecting 
over 3000 practitioners, reviewing practices, as well as organising workshops to aid 
those engaging in counter-narratives. It also hosts an impressive collection of CVE 
practices online to aid those who build their own campaign.  
 There are a number of institutes working regularly with the EU or particular Member 
States on this topic. The ISD aims to build the capacity of locally-run CVE campaigns; 
the Quilliam Foundation offers consultancy to those building strategies against such 
narratives; Moonshot CVE takes a technology-driven approach to assist digital 
campaigns.  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
There are a number of different projects that work in coordination with the EU to counter 
terrorist narratives. The EU Internet Forum is a platform that exists to bridge between the 
EU and tech industries to keep the Internet safe, both by removing content and by 
empowering partners to create and amplify alternative and counter-narratives. The Code of 
Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online is also posited as an important part of 
disrupting potential terrorist narratives online, compelling consenting IT companies to act in 
an appropriate manner to such speech. A further project is the Syria Strategic 
Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT), which later became the European Strategic 
Communication Network (ESCN), created to help stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters 
and violent extremists by providing strategic communications advice and support. Europol 
plays an important role with its content-disrupting IRU, among other roles, such as analysis 
and facilitating dialogue. The EU also facilitates a network of front line practitioners – the 
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) – which provides analysis of existing counter-
narrative efforts as well as other activities in a number of working groups. Finally, there are 
institutes, which work at the European level, often in partnership with either the EU or 
Member States, such as the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), the Quilliam Foundation, 
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and Moonshot CVE. As with the previous section, this represents only a highlighted number 
of initiatives at the European level.  
2.2. EU Internet Forum 
 
In 2015, the European Commission created the EU Internet Forum in an attempt to stop the 
abuse of the Internet by international terrorist groups. This includes the focus on the best 
methods to counter extremist propaganda.67 The Forum acts as a platform between industry 
and the EU, but is careful to retain a focus on working with smaller Internet companies that 
do not have the same resources as the largest players in the online social media market to 
prevent abuse of their platforms.  
The Forum has two different approaches to its work. First, it aims to reduce the amount of 
terrorist content available on the Internet, for which it liaises with Europol and the Internet 
Referral Unit (which will be discussed in Section 3). Second, it empowers civil society partners 
to amplify counter- and alternative narratives to such content.68 This is achieved by the Civil 
Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP), an initiative under the umbrella of the EU Internet 
Forum, launched in 2015. The CSEP works through partnering civil society organisations with 
social media companies, providing training and building capacity as well as “supporting 
campaigns designed to reach vulnerable individuals and those at risk of radicalisation and 
recruitment by extremists.”69 There have been 28 workshops in 2017 as part of this initiative 
in different member states, covering topics such as creating online counter-narratives, 
campaigns, lessons learned, and target audiences.70  
2.3. Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech 
 
In May 2016, the European Commission and a number of the largest players in online content, 
including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Microsoft – ‘the IT companies’ –, announced a 
new Code of Conduct to tackle the spread of illegal hate speech online in Europe. Although 
hate speech and terrorism are topics that are often acted upon separately, both the 
commission and the IT companies deliberately and explicitly addressed the link between the 
two. At the launch, Vĕra Jourová, the EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender 
Equality, suggested that the recent terror attacks in Europe highlight the need to address 
online hate speech, while respecting the values of free speech and democracy.71 The Code of 
Conduct includes commitments to have in place clear and effective processes to review illegal 
hate speech; review the majority of valid notifications within 24 hours; for companies to 
educate and raise awareness among their users about the types of content that is not 
permitted; and to help identify and promote independent counter-narratives and educational 
programmes that encourage critical thinking.72 One year into the programme, the amount of 
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removed content had more than doubled; the number of responses within 24 hours had 
improved from 40% to 51%, and cooperation with civil society leaders had increased, which 
has led to a higher quality of notifications.73 
 
2.4. Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team 
(SSCAT)/European Strategic Communication Network (ESCN) 
 
In the wake of a growing number of foreign terrorist fighters leaving the EU, the Syria 
Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT) was established in January 2015 as an 
eighteen month-project to tackle the “national and local communications challenges in 
discouraging their citizens from travelling to Syria or other conflict zones… [to] participate in 
terrorist activities.”74 The SSCAT’s tasks include the sharing of information and best practice 
of 25 EU Member States on topics such as research, social media training, and 
communications strategies to support counter-narratives.  
 
As the SSCAT’s remit of 18 months came to an end, the project was transitioned into the 
European Strategic Communication Network (ESCN) to continue to make use of the 
information-sharing services to better understand radicalisation and polarisation around 
Europe.75 The ESCN, which began in October 2016, is a year-long project, which focuses “its 
work on a group of selected Member States and support[s] them on how to apply a strategic 
communications approach to develop their own domestic capacity to challenge violent 
extremist influence at the pace and scale required.”76 Unlike other EU-led initiatives, both the 
SSCAT and the ESCN do not operate in the public sphere and, as such, there is little 
information about either project.77    
 
One of the key partners of both the SSCAT and ESCN is the Research, Information and 
Communications Unit (RICU), run by the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism (OSCT) in 
the Home Office of the United Kingdom. Established in 2007, it aims to coordinate strategic 
communications to counter violent extremism. RICU provides “consultancy services to the 
ESCN…as well as providing a bespoke consultancy service to network members.”78 RICU and 
the European Commission both work with public relations company Breakthrough Media to 
design campaigns that “tackle some of the world’s toughest social issues, helping [their] 
clients counter misinformation, [and] prevent violent extremism.”79 The group’s body of work 
include the campaigns Educate Against Hate,80 My Former Life81  – telling the life stories of 
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former violent extremists, and Ummahsonic82  – a multi-media platform providing help and 
support to UK Muslim communities across the Midlands. 
2.5. Europol  
 
Europol is one of the primary actors in strategic communications of counter-terrorism at the 
EU level. Its most prominent strategic use of communication is the content disruption of the 
IRU (to be discussed more thoroughly in Section 3), which aims to minimise the quantity of 
terrorist material on the Internet, first by identifying it, and then through informing the 
Internet service providers (ISPs), which remove illegal content from their domain as well as 
analysing the content for strategic purposes. Europol also works closely with academics and 
practitioners on the use of the Internet by terrorist actors. An example of this is the Advisory 
Group on Online Terrorist Propaganda, consisting of 15 selected members with backgrounds 
in ICT and Social Network Analysis, terrorist propaganda, and psychiatry.83 Furthermore, 
Europol hosted the Online Terrorist Propaganda conference on the 10th and 11th April 2017, 
bringing together 150 participants from a wide range of backgrounds to share ideas on how 
to halt the exploitation of online communications for terrorist narratives.84 Academic output 
from the conference included research on deconstructing identity concepts in IS’s 
Propaganda,85 the role of instructional material in al-Qaeda and IS magazines,86 and the 
response on Twitter to the release of the fifteenth issue of IS’s magazine Dabiq.87 
2.6. Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) 
 
Another actor in the fight against violent extremism is RAN, created in 2011 by the European 
Council. It is a “network of frontline practitioners from across Europe who work on a daily 
basis with people who have already been radicalised or who are vulnerable to 
radicalisation.”88 This includes those who work in the criminal justice system, teachers, 
community workers, and civil society representatives. The thought underlying the network is 
that “fighting terrorism and violent extremism involves more than surveillance and security”89 
and that the most effective prevention strategies are those which stop actors from becoming 
involved in the first place. The network connects over 3000 front line practitioners and has 
peer-reviewed over 100 different anti-radicalisation practices, while at the same time 
organising over 167 events including workshops, study visits and thematic conferences. 90 
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The hub of the network is the RAN Centre of Excellence, which is responsible for logistical 
and administrative matters, connecting a number of umbrella organisations, including a 
number of working groups focusing on topics such as education, deradicalisation, and 
communications and narratives (RAN C&N).91 The C&N working group focuses on utilising 
technology to its fullest potential in the pursuit of CVE, delivering both online and offline 
strategic communications to offer alternative and counter-narratives to those being espoused 
by extremists. It gathers and disseminates insights on four different parts of counter-
narratives: the content of such narratives, the target audiences, the credibility of 
messengers, and the different methods of dissemination.92 The working group hosts a 
number of “Ex-post” papers, which highlight lessons learned after different RAN activities and 
working group meetings.93 One of the most important roles of the network is the “RAN 
Collection” (discussed in Section 3), which hosts an in-depth study of different approaches 
to the prevention of violent extremism, having reviewed over 138 practices in a regularly 
updated document for readers to draw inspiration from. 
 
Another important working group is RAN EXIT, which focuses on deradicalisation and 
disengagement. That is to say, rather than dissuading actors that are merely vulnerable to 
extremist narratives, attempting to reintegrate those who have already adopted extremist 
beliefs and actions. As well as providing an alternative to extremism, the EXIT working group 
also works on practical arrangements, such as education and housing, and develops 
evidence-based interventions with other deradicalisation and disengagement programmes.94 
The EXIT group, too, hosts a number of “Ex-post” papers, such as lessons learned from 
adjacent fields95 and how former members of extremist groups should be utilised in PVE/CVE 
work.96 
 
2.7. Implementing Organisations: Institute for Strategic Dialogue 
(ISD)/Quilliam Foundation/Moonshot CVE 
 
There are a number of implementing organisations, which help to facilitate the creation of 
counter-narratives between governments, industry, and civil society. The London-based ISD 
has, for over a decade, “responded to the rising challenge of extremist movements and the 
ideologies that underpin them, delivering cutting edge programmes built from world-leading 
expertise in communications and technology, grassroots networks, knowledge and research, 
and policy advice.”97 Central to the ISD’s mission is the notion that credible and independent 
community groups are the most effective messengers in delivering counter-narratives, but 
                                                 
 
91 “RAN Working Groups,” European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, last modified November 14, 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran_en.  
92 “Communication and Narratives Working Group (RAN C&N),” European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, 
last modified November 14, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-c-and-n.  
93 Ibid. 
94 “EXIT working group (RAN EXIT),” European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, last modified November 
14, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-
ran/ran-exit_en.  
95 Radicalisation Awareness Network, “Lessons learned from adjacent fields: cults,” Ex Post Paper, June 27-28, 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
“do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-
papers/docs/lessons_from_adjacent_fields_cults_bordeaux_27-28_06_2017_en.pdf.  
96 Radicalisation Awareness Network, “Dos and don’ts of involving formers in PVE/CVE work,” Ex Ante Paper, June 
26-27, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/ 
radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/dos_and_donts_involving_formers_in_pve_cve_work_ 
bordeaux_27_06_2017_en.pdf. 
97 “Who we are,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, https://www.isdglobal.org/isdapproach/. 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 26 
that they can be aided by organisations such as the ISD, who can build capacity and offer 
resources to facilitate their work. The ISD works with a number of different EU governments, 
such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK, as well as with the 
Commission itself. They also operate with a number of communication and technology 
companies, including Facebook, Google, Twitter, Jigsaw, M&C Saatchi, and Microsoft.98 The 
aim is to serve as a bridge between these large-scale operations and local communities to 
enhance collaborative community-based solutions.99  One example of the ISD’s work is the 
Counter-Narrative Toolkit,100 an online resource aimed to inspire would-be local campaigns 
by offering advice on how to plan, create content, and promote counter-narratives (discussed 
in Section 3). Another example is the Extreme Dialogue programme, which “uses the stories 
of real people, told in their own words, raw and unscripted, so that young people can learn 
from those whose lives have been profoundly impacted by extremism.”101 The ISD also 
publishes a number of reports on different topics relating to CVE102 and organises events, 
which foster engagement with stakeholders.103 
 
The Quilliam Foundation, also based in London, claims to be the world’s first counter-
extremism organisation, having spent over a decade aiming “to generate creative, informed 
and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism”104 while 
engaging both with governments and civil society networks. The foundation offers advisory 
services to governments who are developing a counter-extremism strategy or building CVE 
programmes105 and provides STEER (safeguarding, training, education, extremism, and 
radicalisation) training, which equips public sector workers with tools to identify those at risk 
of radicalisation within communities.106 Quilliam also conducts and publishes a significant 
amount of research, such as reports on engaging families in North Africa to counter violent 
extremism,107 radicalisation and counter-radicalisation on the Internet,108  and IS’s online 
propaganda strategy.109 
 
A final organisation which develops counter-narratives against terrorism is Moonshot CVE, 
which focuses on a more technology-oriented plan, using data-driven innovations to build 
digital capacity in countering violent extremism and to assist counter-messaging 
campaigns.110 An example of their work is the partnership with Jigsaw in the Redirect Method 
(discussed in Section 3), which uses targeted advertising for users that are using keywords 
associated with violent extremism and redirecting them to a curated YouTube library of anti-
IS videos.111 
                                                 
 
98 “Partnerships,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, https://www.isdglobal.org/isdapproach/partnerships/.  
99 Ibid.  
100 “Counter-narrative Toolkit,” Counternarratives, http://www.counternarratives.org/. 
101 “Extreme Dialogue UK Launch,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, https://www.isdglobal.org/event/extreme-
dialogue-uk-launch/. 
102 “Publications,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, https://www.isdglobal.org/programmes/research-
insight/publications/. 
103 “Upcoming Events,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, https://www.isdglobal.org/events/.   
104 “About,” Quilliam Foundation, https://www.quilliaminternational.com/about/.  
105“Consultancy,” Quilliam Foundation, https://www.quilliaminternational.com/divisions/quilliam-
global/consultancy/. 
106 “Steer,” Quilliam Foundation, https://www.quilliaminternational.com/steer/.   
107 Yassine Souidi, Julia Ebner, and Saeida Rouass, “FATE: Engaging Family to Counter Violent Extremism in North 
Africa,” Quilliam Foundation, 2016. 
108 Ghaffar Hussain and Erin M. Saltman, “Jihad trending: A comprehensive analysis of online extremism and how 
to counter it,” Quilliam Foundation, 2014.   
109 Charlie Winter, “The Virtual Caliphate: Understanding Islamic State’s propaganda strategy,” Quilliam Foundation, 
2015, https://www.quilliaminternational.com/shop/e-publications/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-
states-propaganda-strategy/. 
110 “About us,” Moonshot CVE, http://moonshotcve.com/. 
111 “Redirect Method,” The Redirect Method.  
Countering Terrorist Narratives 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 27 
3. PRESENT APPROACHES FROM A SELECTION OF EU 
MEMBER STATES AND THIRD COUNTRIES  
KEY FINDINGS 
 Europol and the IRU are among the leading actors in disrupting terrorist 
communications from the Internet, and have, in recent years, seen a marked increase 
in the amount of content removed. 
 Despite this being an important part of strategic communications, and there being 
evidence to suggest it is having an impact on IS’s ability to function online, it is 
insufficient alone. Other strategic communication techniques, both online and offline, 
are important, too. 
 Jigsaw and Microsoft’s Redirect Methods take a more nuanced approach by using 
targeted adverts for users that are searching for extremist content online, redirecting 
users to counter- and alternative narratives. However, there are few metrics to assess 
the success of this method beyond “views” and “click through rates”.  
 A number of organisations, such as RAN, ISD, and Hedayah, offer insight into the 
design of messages and campaigns, building libraries for would-be campaigners to 
draw inspiration from. However, there are questions as to the empirical basis of such 
campaigns and limited evidence on their effectiveness.  
 Some states engage in “Synchronised Message & Action” techniques, in which, rather 
than delivering the message themselves, they facilitate third parties to do so. The 
GEC uses this technique, partnering with the Sawab Center and the RDC3. 
 While this represents a more sophisticated approach than previous state-led counter-
messaging campaigns, such as the CSCC, there are a number of problems that relate 
to the credibility of the messenger, governments being short-term in outlook, and the 
volume of such messages. 
 
This section outlines some of the key approaches currently being pursued in the field, but as 
in the preceding sections, it does not present an exhaustive list of approaches. It is organised 
around four key themes that are indicative of the main trends in tackling IS’s propaganda 
and supported by drawing on case studies of specific projects. Each theme is followed by a 
short analysis. The four themes are: 
 
1) Disruption – The key objective is to interfere with the distribution of propaganda, in short 
to try and stop propaganda at the source, by preventing it from reaching its target audience. 
In particular, this has focussed on taking down propaganda from social media and delete 
offending accounts. 
 
2) Redirect method – Rather than erasing propaganda, it seeks to redirect viewers to different 
messages in an attempt to ‘nudge’ their behaviour. Pioneered by Jigsaw and Moonshot CVE, 
the project redirects those searching for jihadist material to counter-messaging.  
 
3) Campaign and message design – These projects seek to provide information and skills to 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to develop communication campaigns, typically based on 
counter-narrative or alternative-narratives approaches. Whilst disruption seeks to stop the 
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spread of propaganda, this approach seeks to enable CSOs with the skills to confront and 
undermine the propaganda. 
 
4) Government communications and synchronisation message & action – There is a tendency 
for communication campaigns to be designed in a vacuum, disconnected from events in real 
life. Synchronisation approaches take a comprehensive perspective and aim to link messages 
and actions, and to coordinate messaging across government and with international partners. 
The strength of these approaches is to prevent the undermining of a narrative by exposing 
its ‘say-do-gap’, through ensuring message and actions are aligned, and through limiting 
contradictory messaging. 
 
3.1. Disruption Method: Europol – Internet Referral Unit 
 
One of the primary tactics of strategic communication is the disruption of other actors’ 
interactions. The most prominent contemporary example of this tactic can be seen by 
Europol’s IRU, which hosts a team that systematically monitors the flow of terrorist 
communications on the Internet. The idea is based on an initiative set up by the British 
Government, which, in 2010, created the Counterterrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), 
which “acts on tips from the public, the police, and intelligence services. Websites that are 
suspected of being in breach of the law…are examined by a team of specialists and members 
of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).”112 If the CPS concludes that the extremist content 
is in breach of terror laws, then the sites which are hosting the material are informed, and it 
is removed on the basis of being in breach of the sites’ terms of service.113 As well as being 
involved in ‘take-down’ activity, “the unit develops and shares new technologies to assess 
and process Internet content, and to improve the effectiveness of the police response to 
unlawful material.”114 
  
Europol’s IRU has a similar raison d'être, established for the purpose of “reducing the level 
and impact of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda on the internet… [identifying] and 
refer[ring] relevant online content towards concerned internet service providers and 
support[ing] member states with operational and strategic analysis”.115 Similar to the CTIRU, 
it has two core foci, both the removal of content and the provision of operational support and 
strategic analysis to member states and other actors. A third focus is to strive “to become a 
European Centre of Excellence by strategically enhancing partnerships with cooperating 
partners and investing resources in Research & Development Coordination…in the field of 
counter-terrorism.”116 The IRU does not explicitly identify its target audience, yet makes 
several references to the goal of “countering online radicalisation and recruitment efforts by 
terrorists,”117 implying that it is not only those currently engaging in terrorist acts, but also 
those vulnerable to propaganda. Furthermore, rather than trying to proactively police all 
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content on the web, the IRU tactically targets the aftermath of high profile terrorist incidents, 
and their “primary objective is to be relevant during the ‘viral’ time of the propaganda.”118  
 
The IRU has a number of metrics by which success could be measured. Since the Unit’s 
creation, they have held a number of campaigns in which large operations aimed at securing 
the quick removal of online material. In such campaigns, as many as 1,800 pieces of 
extremist content are assessed in collaboration with other dedicated units  and experts from 
EU member states.119 Furthermore, Europol also claims that the total number of pieces of 
content assessed increased over tenfold in the first year of its establishment (1,079 to 
11,050), as well as a fifteenfold increase in proposals to online service providers (690 to 
9787) and an increase from 74% to 91% in the success rate of this content being removed.120 
As part of their goal of providing operational support and strategic analyses, the IRU wrote 
3 chapters as part of the 2016 Terrorism Situation and Trend Report as well as two chapters 
in a handbook on self-radicalisation.121 
3.1.1. Analysis 
 
Whilst the evidence indicates that disruption approaches do have a measurable impact on 
the spread of terrorist propaganda, it is not a silver bullet, but only part of a solution and not 
without limitations. Many commentators have criticised disruption as a futile game of ‘whack-
a-mole’, in which one account taken down is simply replaced by another account.122 However, 
as JM Berger and numerous other scholars have demonstrated in a number of empirical 
studies, suspension and suppression of suspected twitter accounts lead to reductions in 
activity and reach of Violent Extremists.123 However, while disruption may be successful in 
reducing activity on targeted platforms, it risks displacing activity from the likes of Facebook 
and Twitter to other platforms. Research conducted in 2017 found that pro-IS accounts on 
Twitter linked to 39 different platforms or content hosting websites.124 Newer platforms, such 
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as Telegram, which has become IS’s platform of choice,125 often lack the internal capabilities 
to take down terrorist content that have been learned by the more established rivals126 – 
although it would be wrong to suggest that they do not remove content at all.127 However, 
this migration away from mainstream social media accounts is not without benefit, as “the 
private and secure nature of Telegram does not offer the same momentum and ability to 
reach new recruits in the way that Twitter did.”128 The use of hashtags and an open interface 
allowed both the organisation to spread its message easily as well as allowing those curious 
to find such content with greater ease. Telegram requires enough knowhow, potentially, to 
dissuade those without sufficient interest or technical capabilities.  
 
One of the flaws of this approach is that it focusses solely on online cyber-structure as a 
means to prevent radicalisation. However, a number of studies have demonstrated that 
“radicalisation rarely happens exclusively online,”129 but rather that the decisive factor in 
moving from extremist beliefs to becoming a terrorist is having access to offline social 
networks.130 Hence, focusing on disruption in the online world will only ever address part of 
the picture. Ultimately, the most success disruption approaches can have is to prevent 
extremist content from being available online. However, this simply creates an information 
vacuum, and vacuums will always be filled. Whilst disruption is one side of the coin, the other 
necessary side is an effective communication strategy to control what fills the vacuum. 
 
Finally, disruption approaches also raise a number of human rights and free speech issues. 
Whilst in principle it may seem a straightforward approach to take down extremist content, 
this raises the more complex question of what actually constitutes extremist content? And 
importantly, who decides this and on what basis? As the tech companies point out, 
determining what is extremist content is not simple. For example, one of the London Bridge 
attackers was said to have viewed videos by the American radical preacher Ahmad Musa 
Jibril, but, “YouTube says that they don't break its rules because they are religious sermons 
containing no call to violence, so they remain online. Furthermore, the US authorities have 
not sought prosecution of Jibril, so it is not clear on what basis his videos could be removed 
from a global platform.”131 The line where free speech ends and extremist content starts is 
ultimately subjective and a much-debated question. In the cyber-domain this is further 
complicated, where the boundaries between free speech and extremist content vary between 
countries.132 There are, of course, precedents and provisions for geo-blocking specific content 
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where it may be in violation of local law, but they often involve long and drawn-out legal 
battles that make the speedy enforcement of local law difficult.133 In short, when states and 
tech companies are working in harmony, it can be an effective method, but when this unison 
breaks down it can result in significant logjams. 
 
3.2. Redirect Method: Jigsaw and Microsoft  
 
Many actors may consider the removal of content a blunt instrument for all problematic 
content on the Internet for ethical and practical reasons – such as where one draws the line 
between extremist content and political speech. To this end, initiatives have been created 
which offer counter-speech, via online advertising. The “Redirect Method” has been piloted 
by Jigsaw, an initiative by Google, in partnership with Moonshot CVE, Quantum 
Communications, and a team of counter-narrative researchers. The purpose of the method 
was to “ensure that those browsing the Internet with precise questions around violent 
extremism and the Caliphate get answers from the many voices debunking ISIS recruitment 
narratives.”134 Rather than creating any actual counter-narrative content themselves, they 
draw upon an existing catalogue of English and Arabic videos, which are linked to in three 
different ways when an actor is searching specific keywords related to extremism: text 
adverts, image adverts, and skippable video adverts. The reason for this is credibility – it is 
unlikely that multinational organisations are seen as impartial actors by many of those who 
are susceptible to extremist propaganda online, whereas they found “plenty of authentic, 
credible, powerful and relevant video content to curate.”135 The target audience of the 
method is explicitly stated as “reaching the slice of ISIS’ audience that was most susceptible 
to its messaging and actively seeking to engage with ISIS produced content.”136 
 
Jigsaw ran a pilot campaign for the Redirect Method, which lasted for eight weeks. This 
resulted in 500,070 minutes of watched video from a total of 320,906 individuals. They claim 
that because this is the first instance of such an initiative taking place, there are no suitable 
base-rates to compare to their data, but note that they are sharing their results for future 
projects to be evaluate against.137 The “click through rate”, one of the most widely used 
metrics in online advertising, was tested against a control group of adverts that ran on similar 
search terms in the twelve months prior to the launch of the pilot. For the English language 
adverts, it was 76% higher and for Arabic language, it was 79% higher.138  Furthermore, 
there has been active industry engagement. In July 2017, YouTube expanded on the work of 
the Redirect Method in four ways: Increasing the number of languages in search queries in 
languages other than English; using machine learning to dynamically update search terms, 
working with experts to design new counter-narratives, and expanding the redirect method 
in Europe.139 
 
In April 2017, Microsoft announced a similar project in partnership with the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue. Like the Redirect Method, it focuses on advert-based interventions, but 
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on the Bing search engine, run by Microsoft. The aim of the project is to “help us and NGOs 
to better understand the problem, devise an effective and proportionate response, and offer 
individuals a positive alternative to violence and extremism.”140 The year-long pilot, which is 
currently taking place, places adverts in response to certain searches that relate to extremism 
and will “test the efficacy of different types of messaging and video content selected to deter 
people from radicalization.”141 The first set of adverts will be targeted to an audience in the 
UK in English, with later programs including a wider audience in both English and Arabic. 
Both this and the Jigsaw projects will interact with each other in the new Global Internet 
Forum to Counter Terrorism, announced in June 2017, which allows the different initiatives 
to “learn from and contribute to one another’s counterspeech efforts.”142 
3.2.1. Analysis 
 
In terms of the standard advertising metric of click through rate, the Redirect method has 
been a success. However, this metric only really shows how successful the advertisements 
were at gaining views, but sheds little light on whether they actually had any effect or even 
the desired effect on the viewer. This mirrors the most substantial problem in terrorism 
research online; there is a plethora of data relating to the content available to users online, 
but very little that relates to how this content actually affects users.143 This highlights one of 
the key issues of the difficulty in measuring effectiveness and the subsequent lack of 
sufficient monitoring and evaluation.   
 
Unlike other approaches, the Redirect Method is well targeted. As Yasmin Green, Jigsaw’s 
head of research and development, explains, "The Redirect Method is at its heart a targeted 
advertising campaign: Let’s take these individuals who are vulnerable to ISIS' recruitment 
messaging and instead show them information that refutes it.”144 Whilst the redirect method 
has identified an effective way to target those vulnerable to IS messaging, its effectiveness 
still relies on the “information that refutes it”, essentially on message design and content – 
addressed below. While messaging reaching the target audience is a necessity, in order to 
be effective, it still must resonate and be relevant to that audience.145 
  
3.3. Campaign and Message Design Method – RAN, ISD, and the 
Hedayah Center  
 
A different approach to counter-narratives is to target those who deliver such narratives. 
There are a number of platforms, which host and disseminate information to aid those who 
are building responses to terrorist narratives. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) 
was created in 2011 by the European Council with the above as one of its primary 
responsibilities. The objective of the network’s Centre of Excellence is to act as “a hub for 
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connecting, developing and disseminating expertise… [supporting] and coordinating RAN, 
and foster[ing] an inclusive dialogue between practitioners, policy-makers and academics.”146 
RAN recognises that there is often a sizable gap in quality between the propaganda being 
disseminated by groups such as IS and the corresponding counter-narratives, which is often 
caused by the lack of government, civil society and industry partnerships.147 As a result, RAN 
has a number of goals, including the facilitation of partnerships, delivering a series of 
products to aid practitioners, and delivering direct support.148 The most notable product that 
is produced is the Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches 
and Practices collection, which over 434 pages offers seven categories of approaches to 
countering extremism: Training for first-line practitioners, exit strategies, community 
engagement and empowerment, educating young people, family support, delivering counter- 
or alternative narratives, and multi-agency approaches. Each of these categories includes 
the aims, lessons learned, and practices from a number of implementations.149 There are a 
total of 138 practices which are reviewed in the collection and it is ever-growing and regularly 
updated and is intended for readers to draw inspiration from, find examples adaptable to 
their local/specific context, and identify counterparts to exchange on prevention 
experiences.150 
 
The RAN also houses a instructions specifically aimed at delivering counter- or alternative 
narratives.151 It offers a number of important suggestions for the aims and methods of a 
counter-messaging, including a disaggregation of what is meant by counter and alternative 
narratives, as well as government strategic communications, as well as discussing different 
audiences and best methods of reaching them, and lessons learned from past campaigns. It 
also focuses on the different types of messengers: government, civil society, religious 
leaders, former extremists, and victims, and to which role they are best suited and which 
roles they should refrain from entering. For example, governments are well suited towards 
political counter-narratives, but “should steer clear of religious counter narratives,”152 which 
are better tasked to religious leaders. The document also offers an analysis of seventeen 
different practices of counter- and alternative narratives with key information, such as a 
description, approach, target audience, deliverables, evidence and evaluation, and 
sustainability and transferability. The analyses practices include The Abdullah-X Project153 – 
a YouTube campaign focused on building a resistance to young Muslims against the allure of 
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radicalisation; Terrorism: How about listening to what victims have to say?154 – which focuses 
both on teaching schoolchildren and restorative justice of prison inmates engaging in dialogue 
with victims of terrorism; and No-Nazi.net155 – which focused on training young people 
between the ages of 13-18 to counter extremism online. 
 
The Institute for Strategic Dialogue also has an initiative focused on the design of a counter-
narrative campaign called the “Counter Narrative Toolkit”, based online.156 There are four 
key elements to the Toolkit: How to plan a campaign, how to create content, how to promote 
a campaign and a series of case studies in which users can browse. Each stage includes a 
number of different interactive sections, including video tutorials, step-by-step instructions, 
and frequently asked questions. The target audience is for non-experts “with little or no 
previous experience of counter-narrative campaigns.”157 In 2016, the Hedayah Center 
launched their own counter-narrative library to encourage governments, practitioners and 
members of civil society to observe best practice in countering all forms of violent extremism. 
The multi-media library contains “videos, movies, TV shows, cartoons, books, websites, 
magazines, blogs, social media campaigns, articles”158 and is split into two collections – the 
Daesh Defector Collection – featuring narratives of returning foreign terrorist fighters, and 
the South East Asia Collection, featuring counter-narratives specific to violent extremism in 
that region. 
 
3.3.1. Analysis 
 
The goal of such Campaign and Message Design projects is to provide the tools to CSOs to 
be able to develop their own grass roots communication campaigns to counter the terrorist 
propaganda threat. However, there are a number of issues to be raised. 
 
Most of these projects focus on the idea of counter-narratives. As noted in the introduction, 
there is little evidence to support the effectiveness of counter-narrative approaches,159 and 
the theory is based on a lack of empirical research.160 However, this does not mean that 
counter-narratives do not work, but rather that there is a need to prioritise research into 
whether and how they work. Further, research should examine the impact of different types 
of counter-narratives, seeking to identify which work and which do not, and importantly, 
why? It is only by strengthening our understanding and the empirical foundation of counter-
narratives approaches, that it will be possible to develop more effective communication 
campaigns. In practical terms, echoing the section above, this further highlights the need to 
ensure effective monitoring and evaluation of counter-narrative projects. 
 
There is often a focus almost exclusively on the online world, and social media in particular, 
leading to a focus on online messaging to the detriment of other mediums of communication. 
However, lessons from the past have shown the importance of using multiple mediums of 
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communications (online and offline) to enact effective communication campaigns.161 Further, 
counter-narratives are inherently defensive, merely responding “to the opposition’s 
messages, allowing them to set the ground on which the communication battle will be fought 
and to maintain control of the narrative”.162 Historical evidence points to successful 
campaigns combining both defensive and offensive communications. Hence, while counter-
narratives may play a part in a successful communications campaign, they should be seen 
as only one part of a comprehensive messaging strategy.163  
 
Often counter-narrative campaigns are in reality counter-messaging campaigns, in that they 
focus on addressing and rebutting a particular theme in IS propaganda. However, this fails 
to realise the underlying strength of IS propaganda, which is that the group interweaves 
multiple messages on multiple themes to create a coherent, interlocking and re-enforcing 
narrative. As such, focussing on individual themes is unlikely to dismantle the overall 
narrative it aims to counter.164 
 
Many of these approaches have been based on countering IS ideology. However, it is 
questionable whether engaging in direct counter-ideological debates is the most effective 
approach, given that western actors are unlikely to have the necessary credibility.165 The 
focus on ideology has been argued by some to in fact be counter-productive, and has instead 
“further polarize[d] opinion and relations between Muslim immigrant minorities and non-
Muslim majorities”, in the process “fuelling a right-wing backlash and increasing tensions in 
our communities.”166 
3.4. Synchronise Message & Action Method: Governments 
 
The final category of approaches is Government Communications and its evolution to use 
networks, which not only create and deliver counter-narratives, but do so in a coordinated 
manner; not only to avoid duplication but to be mutually reinforcing in nature. That is to say, 
using different messages adhering to the same grand narrative. Furthermore, successful 
messaging campaigns must avoid creating a ‘say-do-gap’, or else be at risk of being 
undermined. One example is the US State Department-run Global Engagement Center (GEC). 
Its predecessor, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), failed in 
trying to engage directly with Islamist extremists online,167 in part because its content was 
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branded with the official State Department seal, and as a result “fell on deaf ears.”168 
 
On 14th March 2016, President Obama enacted Executive Order 13721, creating the GEC and 
revoking the CSCC. The Center’s primary goals are to coordinate, integrate, and synchronise 
“government-wide communications activities directed at foreign audiences abroad in order 
to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist 
organizations.”169 The GEC works in four key areas: First, by offering partnerships with a 
global network of positive messengers operating at a local level – as “many experts recognize 
it is doubtful that direct messages from the government will deter potential [terrorist] 
recruits.”170 Second, in using data analytics to better understand radicalisation dynamics 
online as well as polling operations, target audience studies and academic research. Third, 
by perusing collaborative, thematic campaigns in coordination with other members of the 
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, in which unbranded content is created for global partners. 
Finally, the Center coordinates the different US-based agencies’ day-to-day operations for a 
more complementary approach.171   
 
One such partnership is between the GEC and the United Arab Emirates, who together created 
the Sawab Center,172 a counter-messaging campaign aimed specifically at young Arabs in the 
region, whom they believe to be the most vulnerable to IS’s propaganda. Unlike previous 
counter-narrative initiatives, such as the CSCC, which focused on the group’s brutality, the 
Sawab Center emphases the group’s incompetence, undermining “the idea of ISIL’s 
‘caliphate’ by highlighting their inept governance, crumbling infrastructure and poor health 
services.”173 An example of this is their #deludedfollower campaign, focusing on the issue of 
foreign fighters, which in January 2016 earned 163 million impressions on Twitter.174 Other 
campaigns include #MercyToTheWorlds to “convey a global message of Islam’s merciful and 
tolerant principles… [clarifying] that violent and radical actions by extremists bear no relation 
to the real teachings of Islam”175 and #UnitedByEid, celebrating the diversity “regardless of 
one’s nationality, ethnic group, tribe, sect or gender.”176 The latter campaign of September 
2017 represented the 19th proactive social media campaign by the Sawab Center. As well as 
focusing on IS as part of the output, the Centre also monitors and analyses the propaganda 
output of the group to assess “what is resonating with the small demographic subsets 
targeted by the extremists so that the coalition can produce more research-based 
messaging.”177 The Center’s strategy is based around its social media arms, which have a 
variable level of support: Facebook (1.5 million followers), YouTube (596 followers, 162 
videos with over 800,000 views), Twitter (500,000 followers), and Instagram (75,000 
followers and 2000 posts).  
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A similar project has been announced in association with the GEC and the Malaysian Royal 
Police, which will operate online and adopt a two-pronged ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches based 
on content removal and counter-narratives, respectively, called the Regional Digital Counter-
Messaging Communication Center (RDC3). The purpose of the Centre is to “curb the spread 
of extremist ideology and the influence of Islamic State in the cyberworld.”178 It was initially 
rolled out in just ASEAN states but will be expanded to include China.179 The project is still 
very much in its infancy and there is not much detail with regards to metrics or target 
audience. 
3.4.1. Analysis  
 
The transition of the CSCC to the GEC has shown an evolution in the understanding of how 
to counter terrorist narratives. The CSCC rightfully received criticism for attempting to 
engage directly with terrorist actors online, and without a nuanced understanding of the 
dynamics of the conflict in which they were entering.180 However, the GEC understands that 
the US State Department is not considered a credible messenger among many of the 
communities in which they are trying to reach and, as such, relies on local actors to deliver 
counter-narratives.  
      
It could be argued that this is a naïve approach. A cursory examination would show anyone 
that such communications are funded by the State Department, even if the communications 
no longer bear the department’s logo. Rather, there is a long list of initiatives, which the 
department is a sponsor or partner towards.181 If the aspiration of messages being delivered 
by a credible messenger is serious, the GEC should be less keen to advertise its involvement 
in such initiatives, as it jeopardises the potential success. This, of course, is not politically 
viable because governments are, for a number of reasons, keen to show the ways in which 
they are part of the solution to violent extremism.  
 
The highly political nature of government could also lead to a number of other problems for 
counter-narrative campaigns. First, the political arena is very reactive to public events, which 
can change the focus of government resources and the goals, rather than being focused on 
research-driven outcomes. Second and related, the short-term nature of politics means that 
governments may not be interested in long-term initiatives, which makes effective 
monitoring and evaluation difficult as governments may pull funding if a topic becomes 
politically unpopular or insignificant.  
 
A further problem relates to volume of messages. Despite a significantly increased amount 
of counter-messaging campaigns, the volume of these messages is vastly outweighed by the 
“swarming” strategy employed by IS. ICSR director Peter Neumann described the problem 
testifying before US Congress: “Even if we found the perfect message, the perfect messenger, 
and even if we managed to produce the perfect video, it would still be a drop in the 
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ocean…You need to be loud, you need volume, and you can’t be on your own.”182 Most CVE 
initiatives suffer from a lack of funding, and as a result are “woefully under-staffed and under-
populated. While no one explicitly advocates low-volume messaging as a meritorious 
approach, most prominent campaigns default to that setting.”183 This is, again, an area in 
which there has been some improvement as the Sawab Center tweets at a volume more 
comparable with IS recruiters, however, it “remains a singular voice emanating from one 
account.”184 
 
None of these problems is insurmountable for any government, but they require a degree of 
patience, maturity, and funding to do so. Commitment to ideas, such as credible messengers, 
research-driven foci, and effective monitoring and evaluation, are all central to successful 
counter-narratives.185 Unfortunately, the GEC is suffering from a number of internal problems 
in 2017 and its future is very much in doubt.186 
3.5. Summary 
 
The four themes that are discussed above are not exhaustive; there are many different 
approaches that can be taken in countering terrorist narratives. What is clear from the 
analysis above is that each of four different thematic approaches addresses terrorist 
propaganda from a different angle, and none of them are comprehensive in themselves. 
Instead, each of approaches has merit and, collectively, they create a stronger response to 
terrorist propaganda. Hence, rather than recommending one approach over another, the 
policy recommendations in the next section support all four approaches, and focus on a 
number of cross-cutting factors that are central to strategic communications and are internal 
to each of the approaches.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
182 “The power of the swarm, where next for counter-messaging?” ICSR.  
183 J.M. Berger, “Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption,” 8. 
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4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
KEY FINDINGS 
 Disruption of violent extremist networks should be comprehensive and multi-platform 
to avoid displacement and partnered by targeted messaging to fill the post-disruption 
vacuum.  
 A strategic communications campaign needs a clear and simple-to-understand, 
overarching central narrative to cohere a thematically diverse messaging over the 
short, medium and long term. 
 Strategic literacy, technical literacy and target audience assessments offer essential 
metrics for gauging the efficacy of CT-CVE strategic communications. Assessments 
should begin by establishing pre-implementation baseline measures that can be used 
to gauge effectiveness and efficiency over time.  
 Synchronising CT-CVE strategic communications with actions and events on the 
ground is essential for amplifying trust, credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of a 
target audience for oneself and diminishing those sentiments for adversaries. More 
important than bureaucratic changes are cultural changes within government 
departments to appreciate the value of strategic communications as central to 
operational, strategic and policy decisions. 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline key strategic-policy recommendations drawn from 
the analysis in Section 3 and the latest findings from the fields of scholarship and best 
practice. Five interrelated ‘lines of effort’ are essential to maximising the efficiency and 
effectiveness of CT-CVE strategic communication: disruption activities, campaign and 
message design, target audience, metrics & evaluation, and synchronisation with action. 
While each line of effort is singularly important, the implementation of all five is designed to 
have a cumulatively compounding strategic impact whereby the ‘sum is greater than the 
parts’.187  
 
4.1. Disruption Activities 
 
As outlined in Section 3, disruption activities on social media platforms, such as Twitter, have 
broken apart violent extremist networks, diminished the follower numbers and stunted 
violent extremist activities. Thus, disruption emerges as an essential tool for confronting VE 
networks both online (e.g. shutting down social media accounts) and offline (e.g. law 
enforcement and intelligence operations). However, these initiatives have also driven the 
evolution of violent extremist use of the internet with IS supporters showing a preference for 
encrypted social media platforms which are harder to monitor and infiltrate. Disruption 
activities create vacuums, which represent opportunities for other actors to fill the void.188 
Consequently, disruption activities that are not synchronised with an active messaging effort 
                                                 
 
187 For an example of these lines of effort in a single strategic framework, see: Haroro J. Ingram, “The Strategic 
Logic of the “Linkage-Based” Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: Conceptual and Empirical 
Foundations,” The International Centre for CounterTerrorism – The Hague 8, no. 6 (2017), https://icct.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/ICCT-Ingram-The-Strategic-Logic-of-the-Linkage-Based-Approach.pdf. 
188 J.M. Berger, “Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption”; Conway et al., “Disrupting 
Daesh: Measuring takedown of online terrorist material and its impacts.”  
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may, at best, be missing opportunities to engage with vulnerable audiences and, at worst, 
create vacuums, which other violent extremist entities will seek to fill. These are the 
inevitable pros (e.g. limiting activities on open access forums) and cons (e.g. preference for 
encrypted services by violent extremist groups) that have emerged from disruption 
strategies.189 
 
Building on Section 3, three strategic-policy recommendations contribute to maximising the 
pros and minimising the cons of disruption:  
 
First, disruption needs to be applied comprehensively and across multiple platforms. Given 
that violent extremists are likely to use multiple social media platforms simultaneously, 
disruption efforts may adopt a similarly holistic approach to shutting down social media 
accounts. 
 
Second, the vacuums created by disruption need to be filled with messaging. There is a 
fleeting opportunity immediately after a social media account is shut down for the followers 
of that account to receive messaging before moving to other platforms or starting a new 
social media account. It follows that, just as tech companies play a central role in shutting 
down the social media accounts of violent extremists, this effort should be partnered by the 
targeted dissemination of messaging to the followers of that account. 
 
Third, the messaging deployed to fill the vacuums created by disruption must be a mix of 
rational and identity choice ‘negative’ messaging. For example, immediately after a social 
media account is shutdown, tech companies work to ensure that the followers of that account 
receive a series of messages designed to leverage a range of motivational drivers. The logic 
of deploying a range of messaging is to cater to a potentially diverse motivational spectrum 
in the target audience. This has a dual purpose: (i.) it disseminates a variety of hooks given 
that any given message is more likely to resonate with some than others, and (ii.) a range 
of messages can create a cumulatively reinforcing effect on a target audience.190 
 
4.2. Campaign & Message Design 
 
Two significant trends to emerge from Section 3 are the dominance of counter-narrative and 
theme-centric approaches to CT-CVE strategic communications. Two potential problems arise 
from strategic communication efforts that adopt these principles. First, counter-narrative-
centric strategies are inherently defensive and reactive;191 they depend on the adversary’s 
messaging in order to craft its own messaging. Consequently, the adversary tends to not 
only initiate but shape the pace and nature of the information contest. Historical analyses 
have shown that success in the information theatre tends to follow the actor who 
proportionally disseminates more offensive than defensive messages compared to their 
adversaries.  
 
Second, the dominance of theme-based messaging efforts risks the strategic communications 
campaign falling into cyclical messaging that is less adaptive to change, especially over the 
medium to long term. Thematic approaches to messaging risk ‘communications 
schizophrenia’ by deploying messages that may be thematically consistent from message to 
                                                 
 
189 Joe Whittaker, “The Sound of an Echo,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, June 23, 2017, 
https://icct.nl/publication/the-sound-of-an-echo/. 
190 For a comprehensive analysis of this literature, see: Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai. “Research 
Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Review, 2006-2016.” 
191 Alastair Reed, “IS Propaganda: Should we counter the narrative?”  
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message but lack coherence at a broader campaign narrative level. Violent extremist 
propaganda efforts tend to deploy thematically diverse messages that are cohered around a 
simple central narrative; it is at the heart of the strategic logic of their messaging campaign. 
It is a strategy designed not only to champion the violent extremist group’s objectives but 
their ‘brand’. In order to compete against these adversaries in the information theatre and 
degrade their ‘brand’, CT-CVE strategic communications need to ensure coherent messaging 
over the short, medium and long term, campaign and message design principles need to be 
synchronised.192 A crucial mechanism to this end is the establishment of a clear and simple-
to-understand overarching central narrative. A thematically diverse array of .messaging will 
need to be deployed as part of a modern communications campaign.193 However, the purpose 
of an overarching central narrative is to ensure that despite this thematic diversity, all 
messages are in some way supporting that overarching central narrative. Ultimately, the 
framework of principles used to shape a strategic communications effort needs to be flexible 
enough to apply as context and conditions change.  
 
4.3. Target Audience 
 
Effective strategic communications require both a clear identification of the target audiences 
of a messaging campaign and a nuanced behavioural and attitudinal understanding of that 
audience. The modern communication environment is such that a messaging effort must take 
into account a spectrum of potential consumers of the message: intended, unintended, 
supporters, adversaries and neutrals. Of this varied spectrum of potential consumers, priority 
must inevitably be placed on a primary target audience (e.g. those who may be susceptible 
to violent extremist propaganda). Inevitably, a strategic communications campaign will want 
to narrowly focus on a particular target audience while recognising that the individuals who 
constitute that audience will likely represent a motivationally diverse range of consumers. It 
is for this reason that a strategic communications campaign must deploy a thematically 
diverse range of messaging in order to resonate across a variety of consumers - in short, 
different target audiences require different messages. Thus, developing the most nuanced 
behavioural and attitudinal picture of that target audience is crucial for effective strategic 
communications.  
 
Surveys, focus groups and in-depth interviews (IDIs) provide a multi-tiered means by which 
to develop a nuanced understanding of one’s key target audiences. Behavioural and 
attitudinal factors regarding the legitimacy of and engagement in politically motivated 
violence are more pertinent criteria for understanding a spectrum of potential consumers.194 
Ultimately, conceptual (e.g. survey design principles), methodological (e.g. questionnaire 
structure) and empirical (e.g. representative sample) rigour needs to underpin these efforts. 
Given that the purpose of a strategic communications campaign is to persuasively shape 
attitudes and behaviours in target audiences, it is necessary to establish a pre-
implementation baseline understanding of that target audience. This allows for the multi-
tiered system of surveys, focus groups and interviews to be strategically repeated post-
implementation to measure the impact of strategic communication efforts over time. This 
approach also facilitates a process of ongoing assessments and feedback loops to 
continuously calibrate across campaign and message design levels. Adaptability in CT-CVE 
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strategic communications efforts is essential to effectively confronting an adversary that has 
demonstrated innovation and flexibility in the short, medium and long terms.195  
4.4. Metrics & Evaluation 
 
As Section 3 highlighted, metrics and evaluations represent a significant gap in the field of 
practice. This is the product of several factors: a general misunderstanding of the purposes 
of a strategic communications campaign (see Introduction) and a lack of target audience 
metrics. Measuring the efficacy of strategic communications, i.e. the impact of a strategic 
communications effort, requires multi-tiered assessments196 that focus on measures of: 
 
Strategic literacy: These measures relate to the fundamentals of a strategic 
communications effort such as reach, relevance, resonance, messenger, 
medium and format, which are all crucial to the ‘comprehensiveness’ of a 
messaging effort.  
 
Technical literacy: Measures related to maximising the variety, 
effectiveness and efficiency of mediums of communication used in a 
messaging effort.  
 
Target audience: Identification and understanding of the spectrum of 
consumers of a messaging effort based on behavioural and attitudinal 
criteria.  
 
Ideally, these assessments need to be initially performed prior to the commencement of a 
strategic communications effort in order to establish a baseline measure. Once the baseline 
metrics are established, these assessments need to be regularly implemented as a means to 
gauge the impact of the campaign over time. This is also a means to measure the strategic 
and technical effectiveness and efficiency of the campaign. Additionally, strategic literacy, 
technical literacy and target audience assessments should also be applied to key adversaries 
in the information theatre. This facilitates the empirical calibration of a strategic 
communications effort based on both self-assessment and competitor assessment criteria. 
 
4.5. Synchronisation with Action 
 
A central aim of strategic communications is to amplify the effects of one’s actions while 
diminishing the effects of an adversary’s actions. This dual “force multiplying” and “force 
nullifying” intent requires messaging to synchronise with actions on the ground, whether 
policies, strategies, operations or events. In addition to the pragmatic benefits of using 
messaging in this way, reducing the perceived disparity between what one says and does, 
i.e. narrowing the say-do gap, is essential for boosting trust, credibility and legitimacy. This 
can be a difficult prospect for governments. Coordinating across complex bureaucracies can 
make the synchronisation of messaging across government departments difficult to manage 
let alone synchronising that messaging with a diverse array of actions to avoid contradictions. 
The bureaucratic solutions required to address these issues will be largely unique to each 
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government and department. While these bureaucratic issues are important, the central 
requirement for improving the synchronisation of messaging and action is largely cultural. 
Archaic attitudes that “actions speak louder than words” contribute to an organisational 
culture, often reinforced by doctrine, that affords strategic communications an ex post facto 
role in operations, strategy and policy.  
 
Strategic communications should be a key, if not the central, consideration in operational, 
strategic and policy planning from the beginning of the process. The necessary cultural shift 
is best facilitated by a multidimensional approach that formalises these changes doctrinally, 
across management levels and in staff training. Action is itself a form of communication and 
strategic communications has a powerful role to play as a “force multiplier” of desired 
operational, strategic and policy effects and a means to mitigate undesirable effects. For 
governments within the EU, there is a bottom-up and top-down dynamic that needs to be 
taken into account. From a top-down perspective, governments can play an important role 
in supporting private and civil society sector actors in the information theatre. There will be 
times when the best type of support will be to give such actors space, whereas on other 
occasions, it is necessary to engage in capacity-building efforts. From a bottom-up 
perspective, EU governments may need to take into account broader EU and transnational 
initiatives. These levels of bottom-up and top-down coordination are in fact opportunities for 
greater efficiency and effectiveness towards shared goals.  
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This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy 
Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the 
request of the LIBE Committee, provides an overview of current 
approaches to countering terrorist narratives. The first and second 
sections outline the different responses developed at the global and 
European Union levels. The third section presents an analysis of four 
different approaches to responding to terrorist narratives: disruption 
of propaganda distribution, redirect method, campaign and message 
design, and government communications and synchronisation of 
message and action. The final section offers a number of policy 
recommendations, highlighting five interrelated ‘lines of effort’ 
essential to maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of counter-
terrorism and countering violent extremism strategic communication. 
 
 
